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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Smallholder farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa face several challenges including low 
productivity, food insecurity and low agricultural diversification, which contribute to high 
poverty. To address these challenges, governments in the region have been implementing 
agricultural subsidy programs to raise productivity and promote household food security, 
among other things. The subsidy programs have been associated with some positive impacts 
on productivity but not so much on stimulating overall agricultural growth and poverty 
reduction. In some instances, subsidies have been found to crowd out demand for commercial 
fertilizer.  However, there is a dearth of empirical evidence on whether subsidies can reduce 
the gendered productivity gaps in agriculture. This paper contributes towards filling this gap.  
In particular, we assess the gendered impacts of receiving FISP on productivity and assess 
whether these impacts are heterogeneous between female- and male-managed plots. Unlike 
past studies done at household level, our analysis is at the plot level and distinguishes 
between male- and female-managed plots.  
We applied panel data methods to the two-wave Rural Agricultural Livelihoods Surveys data 
collected in 2012 and 2015.  
The study highlights several findings as follows: 
First, there were several notable differences in the main variables between female-managed 
and male-managed plots. The main outcome variable—the measure for agricultural 
productivity—yield, averaged about 1,400kg /ha. Male-managed plots had a 34kg/ha yield 
advantage over female-managed plots. These results are suggestive of gendered productivity 
gaps.  
Second, there were many differences in plot-specific characteristics. Male-managed plots 
were on average larger than female managed plots and male household heads managed more 
plots than female heads. A larger proportion of female-mangers accessed more FISP and 
commercial fertilizers, and consequently used more basal and top dressing fertilizers than 
their male counterparts. The male-managers, however, used more seed.  Despite the almost 
equal access to credit, female-managers accessed larger amounts than their male counterparts 
among those that accessed credit. Finally, male-plot managers were on average more 
educated, younger, wealthier and had more social capital more than their female counterparts.   
Third, the main empirical results suggest that access to FISP does not disproportionately raise 
crop productivity for female-managed plots. This implies that FISP alone is not sufficient to 
address the gendered productivity gaps in agriculture. These results should not be understood 
to suggest that FISP is bad per se, but rather that FISP is insufficient to address the male-
female productivity gaps. Access to FISP is associated with an average yield gain of 0.8% 
regardless of the gender of the plot manager.  
As a way forward, the government and other stakeholders involved in promotion of FISP 
need to promote a more gender sensitive program that targets more female headed 
households to promote gender equality. There is also need to address the social-cultural 
norms that tip the balance of power dynamics, rights and entitlements towards men. This can 
be done through educational and sensitizations activities.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Smallholder farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) face several challenges including low 
productivity, food insecurity and low agricultural diversification, which contribute to high 
poverty. To address these challenges, governments in the region have been implementing 
agricultural subsidy programs to raise productivity and promote household food security, 
among other things. The subsidy programs have been associated with some positive impacts 
on productivity (FAO 2015; Kato and Greeley 2016; Wossen et al. 2017) but not so much on 
stimulating overall agricultural growth and poverty reduction (Mason and Tembo 2015; 
Mason, Jayne, and van de Walle 2016; Jayne et al. 2016). In some instances, subsidies have 
been found to crowd out demand for commercial fertilizer (Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, and Chirwa 
2011).   
 
There is, however, a dearth of empirical evidence on whether subsidies can reduce the 
gendered productivity gaps in agriculture. Most of the studies on the gendered impacts of 
FISP on productivity are done at household level and distinguish between male- and female-
headed households without addressing intra-household dynamics and impact heterogeneity 
(Kanbur and Haddad, 1994; Alderman et al. 1995; Quisumbing 1996; Ghosh and Kanbur 
2008; Marenya, Menale, and Emilio 2015). This deprives governments of information 
necessary to guide policy decisions on how best to reduce the gendered productivity gaps in 
agriculture. This paper contributes towards filling this gap. In particular, we assess the impact 
of accessing FISP on crop productivity and whether these impacts are heterogeneous between 
female- and male-managed plots.  
 
 
1.1. Brief Background to Agricultural Subsidies in Africa 
Since the 1970s, governments in SSA have used subsidy programs as the main policy 
instrument to address low productivity and food insecurity among smallholder farmers 
(Chirwa and Dorward 2013; Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, and Shively 2013). Subsidies were phased 
out in the early 1990s under the structural adjustment programs (SAPs), arguing that they 
were inefficient and unsustainable. However, they were reintroduced in the early 2000s under 
the name Farmer Input Support s (FISPs) and targeted mainly smallholder farmers (Druilhe 
and Barreiro-Hurle 2012; Liverpool-Tasie 2012; Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, and Chirwa 2011). 
The main purpose of FISP is to increase national food security and stimulate productivity 
among smallholder farmers and reduce overall poverty (Chirwa and Dorward 2013; Ricker-
Gilbert, Jayne, and Shively 2013; Jayne et al. 2016).  
 
Various studies show that FISP has had positive impacts on land productivity (yield) of  
staple crops - maize and rice (FAO 2015; Kato and Greeley 2016; Wossen et al. 2017). 
However, several challenges including inefficient targeting and political interference beset 
FISP implementation. FISP has also crowded out demand for commercial fertilizer, with only 
marginal effects on reducing poverty in the region (Ellis, Devereux, and White 2009; Sitko et 
al. 2012; FAO 2015; Mason and Tembo 2015; Mason, Jayne, and van de Walle 2016; Jayne 
et al. 2016). Inefficient targeting results in problems of exclusion and inclusion: wealthier and 
more powerful, undeserving farmers benefit from the programs at the expense of the most 
deserving poor. This calls for smart targeting to ensure that the intended beneficiaries are 
reached by the program.  
 
Like in most SSA countries, agricultural subsidies have been implemented in Zambia since 
the 1970s.  The Zambian government has been providing fertiliser and seed mainly for the 
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staple crop maize under the conventional FISP where government sources and distributes the 
inputs directly to the farmers. During the 2015/2016 season, the government piloted an 
electronic voucher (e-voucher) based FISP delivery system in 13 districts
1
. In the e-voucher 
based FISP, government co-finances inputs with smallholder farmers. Farmers are then free 
to redeem inputs of their choice from participating private agro-dealers using electronic cards 
(Kuteya et al. 2016). The e-voucher system is meant to increase private sector participation, 
promote timely access to inputs and improve beneficiary targeting as well as promoting 
agriculture diversification.  
 
  
                                                 
1
 Chibombo, Kabwe, Kapiri Mposhi, Mumbwa and Chisamba in Central Province; Ndola District on the 
Copperbelt Province; Chongwe district in Lusaka Province; and Chikankata, Choma, Kalomo, Mazabuka, 
Monze and Pemba Districts in Southern Province. 
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2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The main objective of this paper is to assess the gendered heterogeneous impacts of receiving 
FISP on productivity. At the core is the question whether accessing FISP has differential 
impacts on productivity between females and males. Unequal access to farming inputs such 
as improved seeds, inorganic fertilizers and non-input factors like social capital are the often 
cited reason for agricultural productivity differences between females and males 
(Quisumbing et al. 2014; Namonje-Kapembwa and Chapoto 2016).  
 
There are several reasons why gendered productivity gaps persist. Although unitary 
household models project households as single entities reliant on pooled resources and able to 
make joint and collective resource allocation decisions to maximize a common utility or 
welfare function, the social fabric and individual preferences suggest otherwise. Individuals 
within a household have different preferences and societies, especially in SSA are patriarchal, 
and therefore biased in favour of male household members (Smith et al. 2003; Farnworth, 
Akamandisa, and Hichaambwa 2011; Quisumbing et al. 2014). This inadvertently tips the 
balance of power, rights and entitlements towards males, and engenders unequal access to 
productive resources, which leads to gendered outcomes.  
 
Women often cultivate crops requiring less commercial inputs—also known as less 
masculine crops such as groundnuts—and bear much of the burden of providing agricultural 
labour both on their own plots and on those of their husbands. However, these power 
dynamics dictate that although women can (be coerced) and do provide labour input on their 
husbands’ plots, they mostly cannot assign their husbands to work on their (women’s) plots. 
In addition to this disproportionate agricultural production burden, women are socially 
expected to care for the homestead and children, the sick and elderly, fetch water and cooking 
fuel, and to prepare food for the family. This creates de facto gendered inefficiencies in 
agricultural productivity not because females are bad at farming, but mainly because males 
allocate to themselves the best available plots and requisite inputs.   
 
Different household types embody different power dynamics. So far, the foregoing 
discussions present the case of a female farmer in a male-headed household. While females in 
female-headed households would have more leverage to decide on resource allocations, the 
cultural and societal norms may still be repugnant constraints.  In some societies, regardless 
of their household structure, female farmers still face challenges to own land, secure land 
tenure, access credit, extension and market information (Doss 2010; Chirwa at al. 2011; 
Farnworth, Akamandisa, and Hichaambwa 2011; Karamba and Winters 2015). These 
women-specific disadvantages in turn stifle on-farm investments and productivity growth on 
female farms and leads to a larger proportion female-headed households being poor. An 
observation also called ‘feminization of poverty’.  
 
Agricultural productivity enhancing programs such as FISP can have significan impacts on 
gendered productivity gaps in Agriculture. The direction of the effect is however, ambiguous. 
By construction, FISP should help reduce gender productivity gaps by making available 
improved inputs to both female and male farmers. According to World Bank (2012), if 
women are given the same access as men to improved agricultural inputs such as fertilizer 
and seed, maize yields would increase by as much as 16% in Malawi, 17% in Ghana, and 
19% in western Kenya. FISP can, however, worsen the productivity gaps if female farmers 
face disproportionately more non-input production constraints and if program targeting 
discriminates against women and/or suffers from problems of exclusion and inclusion. In the 
latter case, FISP may exclude female farmers who are eligible to participate in the program. 
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The central focus of FISP on maize-seed and fertilizer (for the period covered in this study) in 
Zambia suggests that the program could disadvantage female farmers who cultivate other 
crops. (Better targeting can help iron out this problem).  
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3. DATA AND METHODS 
3.1. Data 
The data used in this study were collected by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) in 
partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL) and the Indaba 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI). We use a two-wave panel data collected in 
2012 and 2015, hereafter referred to as RALS 2012 and RALS 2015, respectively. Taking the 
2010/2011 farming season as the reference period for the survey, RALS 2012 interviewed a 
total of 8,839 households while RALS 2015 added new households and interviewed a total of 
9,520 households. Both RALS 2012 and 2015 are statistically representative at the provincial 
and national levels and 7, 254 panel households were successfully interviewed over the two-
waves. Readers are referred to RALS 2012 and RALS 2015 survey reports for sampling 
details (CSO/MAL/IAPRI 2012, 2015). The RALS surveys collect the most comprehensive 
data on rural households’ demographic characteristics, farm land use, crop production and 
input use, fruit/vegetables production and sales, livestock, prices, off-farm activities, other 
sources of income, household assets/implements among others, in Zambia.  
 
We use plot-level data from 32,463 plots (16,973 and 15,490 plots 2012 and 2015, 
respectively owned by the 14,508 households over the two-panel waves). We arrived at this 
sample after dropping households without fields, with zero harvest and after accounting for 
missing values. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the data.  
 
 
3.2. Methods 
3.2.1. Empirical Model 
We parametrize the conceptual ideas in section 2 using the following empirical model in the 
spirit of Karamba and Winters (2015):  
 
          (1) 
 
where yijt, yield in kg/ha for household i on plot j at time t – is the main productivity measure 
in this study. Female and FISP are dummies capturing, respectively, female-managed plots in 
a female headed household and access to the farmer input support program in the 2010/2011 
and 2013/2014 seasons. X is a vector of plot specific factors such as seed and fertilizer 
quantities, lime and manure use, time of tillage (whether before or during the rainy season), 
whether the plot has title, plot size and the number of plots per household. tillage is a vector 
of the full range of tillage methods - rip, basin, mound, bund, plow, zero tillage, ridge and 
hand-hoe. Z captures household factors (age and education of head, adult equivalents, access 
to credit, membership to farmer organizations, wealth index). C captures exogenous factors 
such as rainfall and proneness to erosion. year captures survey year dummies. ci is 
unobserved time invariant plot-level unobserved heterogeneity and uijt is the I.I.D 
idiosyncratic error term, and the ’s are estimable parameters.2  
  
                                                 
2
 We omit square terms of all continuous regressors to simplify notation, but they are included in the 
estimated models. 
 xijt o 1 ijt 2 ijt 3 ijt 4 ijt
5 ijt 6 ijt 7 ijt 8 i ijt
y female FISP female FISP
c u
       
     
X
tillage Z C year

   
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The parameter 1 captures the average effects of being a female-managed plot on productivity 
assuming 3 is insignificant, while 2 measures the average effects of FISP on productivity 
regardless of the gender of the plot manager, again assuming that 3 is insignificant. A 
negative or positive 2 shows negative and positive productivity effects of FISP. The 
interpretation changes if 3  (the main policy measure) is significant.  The overall average 
productivity effect of FISP (regardless of the gender of the plot-manager) is equal to 2+3.  
 
After controlling for the female-plot manager, and all else equal, 3 measures the productivity 
effects of FISP on female-managed plots as opposed to male-managed plots. If 3  > 0 and 
significant, this would suggest that FISP reduces the gender productivity gap because it 
would disproportionately raise productivity on female-managed plots, otherwise it reduces it. 
FISP has no effect on the gendered productivity gap if 3 = 0. The estimation clustered 
standard errors to account for intra-cluster correlations across plots.  
 
 
 3.2.2. Identification Strategy 
The empirical model in Eq. (1) is estimated using panel data methods. The main concern here 
is the endogeneity of FISP. FISP is not randomly assigned to households such that those 
farmers who self-select into FISP may have unobserved characteristics that also affect 
productivity even if they hadn’t accessed FISP.  For example, farmers that are more self-
motivated or entrepreneurial, or are better farmers than the peers, perhaps because of good 
farming skills or farm management abilities may be more likely to access FISP, but such 
farmers would have likely higher yields than an average farmer even if they didn’t access 
FISP.  
 
We attempted to test and control for the endogeneity of FISP using the control function 
approach of Wooldridge (2010). Since FISP our main policy variable, is interacted with the 
gender variable, the interaction itself becomes endogenous. Addressing these endogenous 
regressors would require at least two instrumental variables, which we could not find in the 
data set used. We therefore did not pursue this approach further. However, since most of the 
farmer and/or plot specific factors that could cause self-selection into FISP are arguably time 
invariant (e.g., farmer motivation), the use of CRE to control for ci also controls for these 
factors. We also controlled for several observables to account for any remaining 
heterogeneity even after controlling for ci. Therefore, results in this paper should be 
interpreted with caution.   
 
Because we have access to a unique two-wave panel data set, we used a  Mundlak-
Chamberlain correlated random effects (CRE) panel data method to control for time invariant 
plot-level unobserved heterogeneity (ci) (Chamberlain 1984; Mundlak 1978; Wooldridge, 
2010).
3
 If we let Wijt to represent all the time-varying covariates in Eq. (1), where as before, i, 
j, and t index the household, plot, and year, respectively. ci is assumed to be a function of 
 - the plot-level averages (across all time periods) of the time-varying covariates, which are 
included as additional regressors in Eq. (1). Readers are referred to Wooldridge (2010) for 
further details on the use of the CRE approach and to Ngoma, Mason, and Sitko (2015) for a 
recent and similar application.  
                                                 
3
 While a fixed effects (FE) approach would also have been possible, we used CRE in order to preserve the 
many dummy variables in Eq. (1), including the main policy variable FISP. We compare CRE models with OLS 
as a robustness check, and across CRE models with and without endogenous input variables.   
jW
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The table 
presents statistics for the pooled sample and for 2012 and 2015 separately. These results are 
disaggregated by whether the plot was female- or male-managed.  There are several notable 
differences in the main variables between female-managed and male-managed plots. The 
main outcome variable—the measure for agricultural productivity—yield, averaged about 
1,400 kg/ha. Male-managed plots had a yield advantage over female-managed plots, 
especially in 2012. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for the Main Variables 
 Overall 
 
Male managed 
plot 
Female 
managed plot 
T-Stat 
 
Yield (kg/ha) 1375.47 1381.84 1348.30 1.74 * 
Plot size (hectares) 1.29 1.36 0.99 5.49 *** 
Number of plots 4.81 4.90 4.41 16.55 *** 
Accessed FISP (yes =1) 0.58 0.58 0.61 -4.24 *** 
Accessed com. fertilizer (yes =1) 0.89 0.89 0.90 -3.47 *** 
Top dressing fertilizer (kg) 47.89 46.20 56.24 -6.61 *** 
Basal dressing fertilizer (kg) 47.79 46.08 56.25 -6.64 *** 
Kgs of seed used 17.30 17.64 15.82 6.23 *** 
Accessed credit (yes=1) 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.7         
Credit amount (ZMW) [credit > 0] 894.05 698.02 1743.02 -4.89 *** 
Plot with title (yes=1) 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.96         
Tillage before rains (yes=1) 0.19 0.18 0.20 -2.39 ** 
Applied manure (yes = 1) 0.05 0.04 0.05 -2.59 *** 
Applied lime (yes = 1) 0.00 0.00 0.01 -1.06         
Education level head 5.98 6.01 5.84 3.1 *** 
Adult equivalent 4.82 4.82 4.81 0.42         
Number of prime age adults 2.98 2.97 3.01 -1.33         
Age household head 46.73 46.62 47.18 -2.64 *** 
Married household  head (yes =1) 0.78 0.78 0.76 2.7 *** 
Bunding tillage  (yes=1) 0.06 0.06 0.05 3.66 *** 
Ridging  tillage   (yes=1) 0.29 0.29 0.31 -2.68 *** 
Plowing tillage  (yes=1) 0.26 0.26 0.26 -0.64         
Mounding tillage   (yes=1) 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.21         
Zero tillage   (yes=1) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01         
Hand Hoe tillage   (yes=1) 0.32 0.32 0.31 1.93 * 
Basins tillage   (yes=1) 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.48         
Ripping tillage  (yes=1) 0.02 0.01 0.02 -1.5         
HH wealth index from PCA -0.05 -0.03 -0.12 2.99 *** 
Member to farmer group, coop (yes = 1) 0.51 0.51 0.49 2.59 *** 
Source: CSO/MoA/IAPRI RALS 2012 and 2015. 
Notes: ***, **, * imply statistically significant t-test (T-stat) at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (these are 
unweighted); the table also includes access to commercial and FISP fertilizer, and credit amount that are not 
used in the estimations later. N=32,463, with 16,973 and 15, 490 plots 2012 and 2015, respectively owned by 
14,508 households. (The average number of plots per household is 2.24). 
 8 
 
These results are depicted visually in Figures 1 and 2. Albeit small and insignificant in some 
instances, these results are suggestive of gendered productivity gaps. While Figure 1 
compared yields between female and male-managed plots, Figure 2 makes the comparison 
across FISP plots, regardless of the gender of the plot manager. We do not find substantial 
differences in yields even between FISP and non-FISP plots (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 1. Crop Yield Distributions by Female-managed and Male-managed Plots in 2012 and 
2015 
Source: CSO/MoA/IAPRI RALS 2012 and 2015. 
 
Figure 2. Crop Yield Distributions by FISP and Non-FISP Plots in 2012 and 2015 
 
Source: CSO/MoA/IAPRI RALS 2012 and 2015. 
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There were many differences in plot-specific characteristics (Table 1 and Annex Table 1). 
Male-managed plots were on average larger than female managed plots and male household 
heads managed more plots than female heads. This confirms that women are disadvantaged in 
terms of access to resources such as land, access to credit, extension and market information 
(Doss 2010; Farnworth, Akamandisa, and Hichaambwa 2011; Karamba and Winters 2015).  
 
In terms of input use, a larger proportion of female-mangers accessed more FISP and 
commercial fertilizers, and consequently used more basal and top dressing fertilizers than 
their male counterparts. The male-managers, however, used more seed.  Although we find 
almost equal access to credit, female-managers accessed larger amounts than their male 
counterparts among those that accessed credit.  
 
Male-plot managers were on average more educated, younger, wealthier and had more social 
capital (belonged to farmer groups) more than their female counterparts.  As reported by 
Quisumbing et al. (2014) and Namonje-Kapembwa and Chapoto (2016), this confirms the 
disadvantaged position of women, which contributes to their low productivity. Further, most 
of the differences were statistically significant suggesting, as per literature review that 
female-managers may be disadvantaged, but this is better assessed under multivariate models 
as done below.   
 
 
4.1.1. The Geography of Female-managed Plots in Zambia 
We also considered the geography of female-managed plots in Zambia. Overall, results in 
Figures 3 and 4 suggest that less than 20% of all plots were controlled by females in 2012 and 
2015 in Zambia. While we observe some dynamics between 2012 and 2015, the loci of 
female-managed plots appear concentrated around the Copperbelt, Central, Lusaka, Southern 
and Western regions of the country. Understanding why poses a good question, but one that 
is beyond the scope of the current study.  
 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of Female-managed Plots in Zambia in 2012 
 Source: CSO/MoA/IAPRI RALS 2012.  
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Figure 4. Proportion of Female-managed Plots in Zambia in 2015 
Source: CSO/MoA/IAPRI RALS 2015. 
 
4.2. Empirical Results 
We estimated Eq. (1) using different model specifications. Using mainly the OLS estimator, 
results in Table 2 are for ordinary OLS in column (1), CRE in column (2) and CRE without 
the endogenous input variables, tillage variables and without both input and tillage variables 
in columns (3) – (5).  We estimated the results in the last three columns to allay potential 
concerns that endogenous choice variables may influence our main results. Since the results 
are robust across specifications, unless otherwise stated, we will use the full CRE results in 
column (2) for interpretation.  
 
4.2.1. The Heterogeneous Impacts of FISP on Productivity 
Table 2 suggests that access to FISP on female-managed plots (female x FISP) had no 
statistically significant effects on crop yield. These results suggest that access to FISP alone 
is not sufficient to reduce the gender-productivity gaps in agriculture. The heterogeneity in 
access to productive inputs shown in Table 1 and the societal and cultural contexts that are 
biased in favor of men could partly explain these results. These findings are in line with those 
in Karamba and Winters (2015) who found that FISP had insignificant productivity effects 
for female farmers in Malawi.  
Discerning the overall effects of female-manager and access to FISP on productivity requires 
care because our main model includes an interaction term. This is because the female-
manager dummy is significant, but the FISP variable as well as their interaction (female x 
FISP) are insignificantly different from zero. The net effects for these variables are reported 
in Table 3. All else equal, access to FISP regardless of the gender of the plot manager is 
associated with an average yield increase of about 0.8%. This result is statistically significant 
at 5%. The negative coefficient on the female-manager dummy is suggestive of the existence 
of gendered productivity gaps in Zambia (although the net effect in Table 3 is insignificant). 
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Table 2. Estimates of the Impacts of FISP on the Log of Crop Yield (kg/ha) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables OLS CRE 
CRE without 
input 
variables 
CRE without 
tillage 
variables 
CRE without 
tillage and 
input 
variables 
Female manager (yes =1) -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.085*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Accessed FISP (yes =1) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.019 0.019 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Female manager x FISP 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.063 0.063 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
Plot size 0.007*** 0.250*** 0.540*** 0.234*** 0.539*** 
 (0.002) (0.022) (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) 
Number of plots -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Top dressing fertilizer/100 0.574*** 1.418*** - 1.441*** - 
 (0.086) (0.097) - (0.098) - 
Basal dressing fertilizer/100 0.120 0.120 - 0.116 - 
 (0.086) (0.086) - (0.086) - 
Seed rate  0.008*** 0.026*** - 0.024*** - 
 (0.001) (0.002) - (0.002) - 
Accessed credit (yes =1) 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Plot titled (yes=1) 0.068** 0.068** 0.068** 0.065** 0.066** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
Tillage before rains (yes=1) 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Applied manure (yes = 1) 0.013 0.014 - -0.022 - 
 (0.035) (0.035) - (0.036) - 
Applied lime (yes = 1) 0.068 0.069 - 0.065 - 
 (0.117) (0.117) - (0.115) - 
Education household head 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Adult equivalents -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age household head 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Bunding tillage (yes =1) 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.132*** - - 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) - - 
Ridge tillage (yes =1) -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 - - 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) - - 
Plow tillage (yes =1) -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.140*** - - 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) - - 
Mound tillage (yes =1) 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.208*** - - 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) - - 
Zero tillage (yes =1) 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.161*** - - 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) - - 
Basin tillage (yes =1) 0.100* 0.099* 0.102* - - 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) - - 
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Table 2 cont. 
Rip tillage (yes =1) -0.060 -0.060 -0.056 - - 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) - - 
Wealth index 0.011** 0.011** 1.584*** 0.009** 1.579*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.042) (0.005) (0.043) 
Member farmer organization -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Seasonal rainfall /100 -0.035** -0.036** -1.313*** -0.034* -1.303*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.040) (0.018) (0.040) 
Prone to erosion (yes = 1) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.016 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
2015  0.134*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant 6.568*** 6.568*** 6.569*** 6.531*** 6.529*** 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.096) (0.097) 
Observations (plots) 28,956 28,956 28,956 28,956 28,956 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis; ***, **, * imply statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively; hand hoe and 2012 are base tillage and year respectively. The main results do not change 
even when we use the total quantity of FISP fertilizer received by households. 
 
 
Table 3. Overall Average Marginal Effects of Access to FISP and Female-Managed 
Plots on the Log of Crop Yield (Based on CRE Results in Column 2 in Table 2) 
 Marginal effect Standard Error T-Stat  
Accessed FISP (yes=1) 0.075  0.034 2.20  
Female managed plot (yes=1) -0.021  0.024 -0.85  
Source: Authors’ computations using CSO/MoA/IAPRI RALS 2012 and 2015. 
Notes: The overall marginal effects in this table are the overall effects of accessing FISP (regardless of the 
gender of the plot manager) and of female-managed plots on productivity. They are net of the FISP and female-
manager interaction effects in Table 3. These marginal effects should be multiplied by 100% since the 
dependent variable was log transformed.  
 
 
When considered in totality, the descriptive and empirical results in this paper are 
reinforcing. Access to FISP does not disproportionately raise crop productivity for female-
managed plots, implying that FISP alone is not sufficient to address the gendered productivity 
gaps in agriculture. These results should not be understood to suggest that FISP is bad per se, 
but rather that FISP is insufficient to address the male-female productivity gaps. There are 
several reasons for this. Intra-and inter-household, as well as societal norms that shift power 
dynamics, rights and entitlements towards men leave women exposed to the least productive 
plots and/or agricultural lands.  
 
Because women in African societies disproportionately shoulder much of the agricultural 
labor burden and tend the homesteads, children and the elderly; they have less time to work 
on their farms. This means, even if women had access to productive inputs as much as men—
a tenet seemingly fostered in FISP—they may still have lower productivity. Addressing the 
male-female productivity gaps therefore requires a paradigm shift: a move beyond the 
obvious knee-jerk policies of only providing productive inputs to addressing the under-
laying, deep-rooted socio-cultural norms that disadvantage and marginalize women. These 
may include improving women’s access to agricultural information, land access and decision 
making power within the households as well as in production decisions on the main plots. It 
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should also involve empowering men themselves to value women and accommodate women 
as co-managers of the household main plots. 
 
4.2.2. Other Drivers of Crop Yield 
Results on the other drivers of productivity are standard: fertilizer and seed rates, secure plot 
tenure, farming experience (proxied by age of household head), early tillage, zero tillage, 
basin tillage, as well as bund and mound tillage systems are associated with increased 
productivity. However, plow tillage relative to hand-hoe tillage (the base), as well as seasonal 
rainfall reduce productivity.   
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study assessed the heterogeneous gendered impacts of access to the Farmer Input 
Support Programme (FISP) on productivity.  Using two-wave panel data from Zambia’s 
Rural Agricultural Livelihoods Surveys of 2012 and 2015, the analysis was done at plot level 
and segregated by the gender of the plot manager.  We further find that despite the 
heterogeneity in access to inputs, there were no significant gender differences in productivity 
among FISP recipients as well as between FISP and non-FISP plots. Further, male-managed 
plots were on average larger than female managed plots confirming the disadvantaged 
position of women in access to agricultural resources necessary to increase productivity.   
 
In terms of input use, this study found that a larger proportion of female-mangers accessed 
FISP and commercial fertilizers, and consequently used more basal and top dressing 
fertilizers than their male counterparts. Male-plot managers were on average more educated, 
younger, wealthier and had more social capital. Most of the differences were statistically 
significant suggesting that female-managers may be disadvantaged.  
 
Our overall empirical results suggest that access to FISP does not disproportionately raise 
crop productivity for female-managed plots, implying that FISP alone is not sufficient to 
address the gendered productivity gaps in agriculture. These results should not be understood 
to suggest that FISP is bad per se, but rather that FISP is insufficient to address the male-
female productivity gaps. Female farmers face a lot more non-input constraints to production.  
Since productivity growth stimulates poverty reduction, this places females at a disadvantage 
in terms of poverty reduction possibilities as compared to males. These results suggest that 
addressing factors that shape power dynamics in the household such as socio-cultural norms 
and decision making is critical in attempts to raise productivity and close the gender gaps in 
agriculture. In this light we make the following recommendations.  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture, together with line ministries and other stakeholders involved in 
promotion of FISP need to promote a more gender sensitive program that targets more female 
headed households to promote gender equality. 
 
FISP implementers need to incorporate educational activities that challenge social-cultural 
norms at household level to promote access to FISP inputs. These could include promoting 
women’s decision making power within the household. This can further be done by 
facilitating access to gender sensitive agricultural information for females and their spouses, 
through, for example, village groups. 
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Annex Table 1. Full Summary Statistics of the Main Variables 
 Full sample 2015 2012 
 
Overall 
Male 
managed 
plot 
Female 
managed 
plot T-Stat 
Male 
managed 
plot 
Female 
managed 
plot T-Stat 
Male 
managed 
plot 
Female 
managed 
plot T-Stat 
Yield (kg/ha) 1375.47 1381.84 1348.30 1.74 * 1403.94 1400.59 0.13         1363.82 1275.23 3.01 *** 
Plot size (hectares) 1.29 1.36 0.99 5.49 *** 1.56 1.06 4.34 *** 1.20 0.89 4.4 *** 
Number of plots 4.81 4.90 4.41 16.55 *** 4.91 4.57 8.77 *** 4.89 4.18 15.39 *** 
Accessed FISP (yes =1) 0.58 0.58 0.61 -4.24 *** 0.58 0.62 -4.01 *** 0.57 0.59 -1.54         
Accessed com. fertilizer (yes =1) 0.89 0.89 0.90 -3.47 *** 0.95 0.96 -3.35 *** 0.84 0.82 2.2 ** 
Top dressing fertilizer (kg) 47.89 46.20 56.24 -6.61 *** 127.87 123.24 1.5         28.30 30.16 -1.25         
Basal dressing fertilizer (kg) 47.79 46.08 56.25 -6.64 *** 127.00 124.87 0.68         28.39 30.19 -1.2         
Kgs of seed used 17.30 17.64 15.82 6.23 *** 17.69 15.88 5.19 *** 17.61 15.73 3.86 *** 
Accessed credit (yes=1) 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.7         0.24 0.22 2.3 ** 0.23 0.25 -1.6         
Credit amount (ZMW) [credit > 0] 894.05 698.02 1743.02 -4.89 *** 979.40 1059.46 -0.8         462.99 2587.48 -5.06 *** 
Plot with title (yes=1) 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.96         0.05 0.05 -1.18         0.10 0.11 -0.52         
Tillage before rains (yes=1) 0.19 0.18 0.20 -2.39 ** 0.24 0.24 0.58         0.13 0.14 -0.36         
Applied manure (yes = 1) 0.05 0.04 0.05 -2.59 *** 0.06 0.07 -1.4         0.03 0.03 -0.2         
Applied lime (yes = 1) 0.00 0.00 0.01 -1.06         0.00 0.01 -0.91         0.00 0.01 -0.82         
Education level head 5.98 6.01 5.84 3.1 *** 5.92 5.77 2.02 ** 6.08 5.94 1.75 * 
Adult equivalent 4.82 4.82 4.81 0.42         4.98 5.01 -0.61         4.68 4.52 3.45 *** 
Number of prime age adults 2.98 2.97 3.01 -1.33         3.17 3.18 -0.25         2.81 2.76 1.45         
Age household head 46.73 46.62 47.18 -2.64 *** 48.14 48.65 -1.84 * 45.39 45.11 0.86         
Married household  head (yes =1) 0.78 0.78 0.76 2.7 *** 0.71 0.73 -2.26 ** 0.83 0.81 3.4 *** 
Bunding tillage  (yes=1) 0.06 0.06 0.05 3.66 *** 0.02 0.02 0.72         0.09 0.09 0.8         
Ridging  tillage   (yes=1) 0.29 0.29 0.31 -2.68 *** 0.32 0.34 -2.32 ** 0.27 0.26 0.38         
Plowing tillage  (yes=1) 0.26 0.26 0.26 -0.64         0.29 0.29 -0.19         0.22 0.21 1.65 * 
Mounding tillage   (yes=1) 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.21         0.01 0.01 -0.97         0.03 0.03 -1.13         
Zero tillage   (yes=1) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01         0.03 0.03 1.7 * 0.01 0.01 0.07         
Hand Hoe tillage   (yes=1) 0.32 0.32 0.31 1.93 * 0.27 0.26 1.4         0.37 0.39 -1.68 * 
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Source: CSO/MoA/IAPRI RALS 2012 and 2015 
Notes: ***, **, * imply statistically significant t-test (T-stat) at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (these are unweighted); the table also includes access to commercial and FISP 
fertilizer, and credit amount that are not used in the estimations later. N=32,463, with 16,973 and 15, 490 plots 2012 and 2015, respectively owned by 14,508 households. (The 
average number of plots per household is 2.24). 
 
 
 
Annex Table 1 cont.           
Basins tillage   (yes=1) 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.48         0.02 0.02 0.82         0.01 0.01 0.38         
Ripping tillage  (yes=1) 0.02 0.01 0.02 -1.5         0.02 0.02 0.52         0.01 0.01 -1.51         
HH wealth index from PCA -0.05 -0.03 -0.12 2.99 *** -0.04 -0.13 2.11 ** -0.03 -0.11 1.99 ** 
Member to farmer group, coop (yes = 1) 0.51 0.51 0.49 2.59 *** 0.54 0.52 2.24 ** 0.49 0.45 3.09 *** 
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